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Abstract 
Australia’s anti-corruption system needs reform. The diffusion of responsibilities across 
multiple agencies risks under-reporting of corrupt conduct, while gaps in the regime mean 
that the system fails to hold people accountable. As a result, community and public 
confidence in Australia’s institutions is eroded. The solution is a national whole-of-
government anti-corruption body encompassing the public sector with the power to apply a 
uniform standard of corrupt conduct. 
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On 8 February 2017, the Australian Senate established a Select Committee to inquire and 
report on the establishment of a national integrity commission. This Committee follows on 
from the 2016 Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity Commission 
which lapsed on 9 May 2016 at the dissolution of the Parliament for the 2 July double 
dissolution general election. This inquiry comes at a time of renewed focus on Australia’s 
anti-corruption and integrity system. In particular, while every Australian state has a whole-of-
government specialist anti-corruption agency,1 efforts to introduce a similar body at the 
federal level have so far been resisted.2 In this article, we explore Australia’s existing anti-
corruption regime. We identify two major problems that arise from the current system and 
argue that these challenges have a causal relationship to declining trust in Australia’s 
democratic institutions. We argue that a national whole-of-government anti-corruption body 
will resolve the problems we identify, and assist in arresting waning faith in government.   
 
                                                          
1 NSW: Independent Commission Against Corruption (1988); Qld: Crime and Corruption Commission (1991); 
WA: Crime and Corruption Commission (1992); Tas: Integrity Commission Tasmania (2010); Vic: Independent 
Broad-based Anti-Corruption Agency (2012); SA: Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (2012).  




The existing system: The multi-agency approach  
Australia’s existing anti-corruption and integrity system divides responsibilities across several 
Commonwealth agencies. Characterised as the ‘multi-agency’ approach, this framework 
empowers different institutions with ‘specific responsibilities for tackling corruption in different 
levels of government, and in relation to specific types of corruption’.3 It is premised on the 
fact that ‘the risks of corruption in the Australian Public Service vary according to each 
agency’s operating environment’, and that anti-corruption efforts will be best realised when 
each agency ‘consider[s] their own risk profile[] and take[s] reasonable measures to mitigate 
risks’.4 However, as Professor AJ Brown has explained, a ‘multi-faceted approach is not 
automatically a comprehensive approach’.5 Indeed, at present, Australia’s legislative, 
institutional and policy framework governing all facets of institutional, organisational, political 
and electoral, and individual corruption and misconduct is under-inclusive and unwieldy.  
 
Our article centres on two difficulties that arise from the multi-agency approach. First, the 
existence of multiple agencies with responsibility for detecting and investigating corrupt 
conduct makes it difficult for persons alleging such conduct to know which body they should 
approach in order to make their allegations, resulting in under-reporting and confusion. 
Second, despite the proliferation of anti-corruption agencies, the current arrangements do 
not apply equally to all sectors of the Australian government. For instance, federal politicians 
are not subject to legally enforceable anti-corruption accountability mechanisms. Recurring 
high profile cases of federal parliamentarians behaving outside community expectations 
indicates that this gap is of significant concern.  
 
Australia’s major anti-corruption institutions 
The 2016 Interim Report of the Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity 
Commission identified several institutions with mandates that encompass the enforcement of 
public sector integrity and anti-corruption within the Commonwealth sphere. Major institutions 
are the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP), the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC), the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman and the Office of the Commonwealth Auditor-General.  
 
Consistent with the Commonwealth’s approach, these institutions work within different parts 
of government and are tasked with investigating and deterring differing types of corruption. 
                                                          
3 Attorney-General's Department, The Commonwealth's Approach to Anti-Corruption (Discussion Paper, 2012) 
4.  
4 Australian Public Service Commission, State of the Service Report 2012–2013 (2013) 71. 
5 Evidence to Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity Commission, Parliament of 
Australia, Canberra, Canberra, 21 April 2016, 10 (Professor AJ Brown).  
 
 
The ACLEI’s primary role is to investigate law enforcement-related corruption,6 
encompassing oversight of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the AFP, the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, prescribed aspects of the Department 
of Agriculture and Water Resources, and the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection. The AFP investigates serious and complex crimes, including fraud against 
Australian government programs whether committed within or outside Australia. The APSC is 
responsible for promoting the Australian Public Service’s Values and Code of Conduct and 
ensuring that government agencies comply with the Code.7 Among other values, the Code of 
Conduct contains principles relating to managing conflicts of interest, and using 
Commonwealth resources. The Commonwealth Ombudsman undertakes investigations into 
complaints received from members of the public concerning government administrative 
action, as well as initiating investigations into systemic problems on its own motion.8 Finally, 
the Commonwealth Auditor-General and Australian National Audit Office independently 
assess selected areas of public administration and provide assurance about public sector 
financial reporting, administration and accountability.9  
 
There is evidence that these bodies are effective, within their scope of operations, in 
combating corruption. High-profile instances of corrupt conduct, such as the Australian 
Wheat Board oil-for-wheat scandal, and the Note Printing Australia and Securency scandal, 
in which organisations were found to be paying bribes to secure lucrative international 
contracts, suggests that the multi-agency approach can detect, investigate and prosecute 
acts of corruption. Indeed, Transparency International places Australia in the top echelon of 
‘clean’ countries. The latest report ranked Australia 13th in the world.10 However, there has 
been a slide in Australia’s position: in 2012, for instance, Australia was ranked 7th.11 Equally, 
discovery of even large-scale incidents of corruption is not evidence that all corruption is 
uncovered. In fact, evidence suggests that two problems beset Australia’s current system. 
First, that the current multi-agency approach may make it difficult for persons alleging corrupt 
conduct to know which body they should approach to make their allegations, resulting in 
under-reporting. Second, that gaps in the regime mean some persons avoid being held 
accountable for corrupt conduct.  
 
The multi-agency approach may under-report incidents of corruption   
                                                          
6 Law Enforcement Integrity Commission Act 2006 (Cth) Pt 13, Div 3.  
7 Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) Pt 5. 
8 Ombudsman Act 1979 (Cth) s 5.  
9 Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth) Pt 4, Pt 6. 
10 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 (Transparency International, 2017) 4.  
11 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 (Transparency International, 2012) 3. 
 
 
Under Australia’s multi-agency approach, corruption and misconduct is tackled by different 
institutions under an ad hoc collection of federal laws. Consequently, it can be unclear which 
agency is responsible for a matter. In these circumstances, there is a substantial risk that 
breaches of public trust, dishonesty and corruption may fall between the cracks. This can 
lead to failures to prevent corruption, and an under-reporting and under-investigation of the 
problem. In their submission to the 2016 Select Committee on the Establishment of a 
National Integrity Commission, Gabrielle Appleby, Sean Brennan, Shipra Chordia and Grant 
Hoole recognised this risk. They explained that diffusing integrity and anti-corruption 
functions across multiple institutions ‘may deny individuals, including citizens and public 
service employees, a prominent and accessible point of contact for reporting concerns’.12  
 
This problem at the federal level can be contrasted with approaches at the state level. In 
New South Wales, for instance, anyone with a lead on corrupt conduct can go to the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption website, where a prominent ‘report corruption 
here’ button invites them to take action. By contrast, at the federal level, people with 
information can find it hard to know where to start, which may stop them from coming 
forward. Empirical evidence suggests this risk is a reality. The APSC 2016 Employee Census 
reported that, over the previous year, more than 3000 federal public servants had seen 
inappropriate or illegal behaviour at work, including conflicts of interest, nepotism, blackmail, 
bribery, fraud and collusion with criminals. Disturbingly, only a third reported this behaviour to 
their supervisor. The larger group said that they were unsure how to report corruption, and so 
the problem was not properly dealt with.13  
 
Earlier APSC Employee Censuses returned similar results. In 2014, almost 2600 public 
servants reported that they had witnessed another employee engaging in behaviour they 
considered serious enough to be viewed as corruption. Of these, only 44 per cent reported 
the behaviour.14 In 2015, only 34 per cent of those who witnessed suspected corrupt 
behaviour, reported it.15 There are many reasons why people might under-report corruption 
in their organisation, including fears of retaliation. Unfortunately, these two earlier surveys did 
not ask why respondents did not report the alleged corrupt conduct. It appears likely 
however, that the reasons identified in the 2016 census were important. That is, the 
proliferation of anti-corruption agencies is confusing.   
 
                                                          
12 Gabrielle Appleby et al, Submission No. 19 to Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity 
Commission, 20 April 2016, 12.  
13 Australian Public Service Commission, State of the Service Report 2015–2016 (2016) 27-28. 
14 Australian Public Service Commission, State of the Service Report 2013–2014 (2014) 237. 
15 Australian Public Service Commission, State of the Service Report 2014–2015 (2015) 46. 
 
 
The problem of under-reporting could be rectified by making the existing agencies more 
prominent so that it was clearer where people could lodge their allegations. For instance, the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman could serve as a one-stop-shop for any allegation of corruption, 
and then direct allegations to the appropriate organisation. However, while this may increase 
reporting, it would not satisfy the second problem with the multi-agency approach: gaps in 
coverage. One of the most significant gaps concerns the federal Parliament. Only a national 
integrity commission with a clearly defined role and responsibility could resolve both of these 
problems.  
 
The multi-agency approach leaves significant gaps in coverage  
Despite the number of institutions dedicated to investigating corruption across government 
agencies, the breadth of Australia’s current anti-corruption system is inadequate. Excepting 
potential AFP investigations into criminal conduct, there are no independent integrity or anti-
corruption mechanisms with the authority to monitor the federal Parliament. Instead, 
members of Parliament are held accountable by soft-law instruments and unenforceable 
codes of conduct. These include the 2013 Standards of Ministerial Ethics, the Statement of 
Standards for Ministerial Staff, the Lobbying Code of Conduct, and Register of Lobbyists. 
While such unenforceable statements are prevalent across the public and private sector, 
evidence suggests that they are only effective if sanctions apply for their breach.16 
 
The Attorney-General’s Department justifies unenforceable codes of conduct on the basis 
that ‘robust democratic institutions’ are more effective in ‘promoting a fair and transparent 
society and combatting corruption’17 than legally enforceable standards. The Department 
identifies parliamentary committees, a free media, civil society and Royal Commissions, as 
democratic institutions that can play this role. Certainly, at times, such institutions have been 
effective at exposing instances of misconduct. For instance, the 2015 Royal Commission into 
the Home Insulation Program found that failures of ministers and public servants in the 
design and implementation of the home insulation program led to the deaths of four men.18 
Similarly, in recent years the media has been significant in revealing parliamentary expenses 
scandals. Nonetheless, however robust these democratic institutions may be, they are not 
designed to perform the systemic anti-corruption role prescribed by the Attorney-General’s 
Department. Although a Royal Commission is a major formal public inquiry with considerable 
powers, it is ad hoc and can only investigate according to defined terms of reference.  
                                                          
16 Alan Doig and John Wilson, ‘The Effectiveness of Codes of Conduct’ (1998) 7 Business Ethics: A European 
Review 140-149. 
17 Attorney-General's Department, above n 3, 11.  
18 Ian Hangar AM QC, Report of the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program (Commonwealth of 




In addition, democratic accountability mechanisms, such as the ballot box, can be blunt 
instruments.19 Voters are unlikely to have complete information about a candidate’s 
behaviour, and may vote for a party based on decisions around the performance of the 
government and the opposition, rather than an individual. Further, as an inherently political 
body, Parliamentarians can shield members of their own political party from scrutiny, 
preventing proper accountability. Relatedly, allegations can take years to resolve, often until 
public attention has moved on, or the member in question has left Parliament. Recent 
examples elucidate the failures of the unenforceable soft-law anti-corruption mechanisms 
that exist for federal politicians.  
 
Over the last few years, repeated scandals involving federal parliamentarians misusing 
entitlements has raised alarms over Australia’s anti-corruption and integrity system. 
Revelations that taxpayers have paid for politicians to attend weddings,20 undertake book 
tours,21 tour local Canberra wineries,22 attend family ski holidays,23 sell haircare products,24 
and fly interstate to inspect and purchase luxury accommodation,25 has fuelled public distrust 
in federal parliamentarians. This distrust is heightened by the process of investigating 
allegations of entitlement abuse. Since 1998, the Department of Finance and Deregulation 
has been tasked with this role. The Department investigates internally, asking the member to 
explain why the expenses were incurred. It also has the power to refer serious matters to the 
AFP to determine whether proceedings should be brought in court.26 However, under this 
protocol, politicians generally repay expenses that have been wrongly claimed rather than 
                                                          
19 Alysia Blackham and George Williams, ‘The Accountability of Members of Australia’s Federal Parliament for 
Misconduct’ (2013) 13 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 115, 117. 
20 James Robertson and Jonathan Swan, ‘Buck bucks’ for MPs Bollywood adventure’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 6 October 2013 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/big-bucks-for-mps-bollywood-
adventure-20131005-2v0wf.html.  
21 Glenn Milne, ‘How Taxpayers Helped Tony Abbott Flog Battlelines’, ABC News, 29 September 2010 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-07-28/35544.   
22 See Slipper v Turner [2015] ACTSC 27 (26 February 2015) [66]. 
23 Jonathan Swan and Daniel Hurst, ‘Expenses Critic Mark Dreyfus Embarrassed over Taxpayer Ski Trip to 
Perisher’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 8 October 2013 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/expenses-critic-mark-dreyfus-embarrassed-over-taxpayer-ski-trip-to-perisher-20131008-2v5sc.html.   
24 Hedley Thomas, ‘Tim Mathieson’s car use cost Julia Gillard $4000’, The Australian (Sydney), 17 September 
2013 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/tim-mathiesons-car-use-cost-julia-gillard-4000/news-
story/6267159bdfa5d9748d1d2ea0b7c7f9ef.   
25 Stephanie Anderson and Ashlynne McGhee, ‘Sussan Ley Defends Purchase of $800k Unit on Taxpayer-
Funded Trip to Gold Coast’, ABC News, 6 January 2017 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-06/leys-purchase-
of-unit-on-taxpayer-funded-trip-not-planned/8165414.   
26 Department of Finance and Deregulation, Protocol Followed when an Allegation is Received of Alleged 
Misuse of Entitlement by a Member or Senator (tabled in the Senate by the then Special Minister of State on 31 
October 2000). Available at: http://maps.finance.gov.au/docs/Protocol_on_Allegations.pdf. 
 
 
are investigated by the AFP.27 While numerous reviews and audits have identified that the 
remuneration and entitlements framework is ‘complex’ and difficult to understand and 
‘manage for both the Parliamentarians and relevant departments’,28 politicians operate under 
a different system to ordinary members of the public. Indeed, while some federal ministers 
have been demoted due to expenses scandals, they are not subject to the same standards 
faced by other members of the public found to have misappropriated monies. This has been 
a cause of longstanding public concern. 
 
Most recently, reports have emerged that former Speaker Bronwyn Bishop refused to 
cooperate with a 2015 Department of Finance review into her travel and related entitlements 
sparked by the revelation that she charted a $5227.27 helicopter for travel from Melbourne to 
a Liberal Party function in Geelong in 2015. The Report indicates that Ms Bishop ‘provided 
limited explanations of her reasons for claiming various entitlements, making it impossible for 
the department to verify whether her claims were a legitimate use of taxpayer dollars or 
not’.29 The Report explained that, as it ‘is reliant on information provided by Mrs Bishop to 
fulfil its role in the exercise, no further assessment is possible in relation to the incomplete 
seven years’.30 The inadequacy of the Report, as well as meaningful accountability over 
broader misuse of entitlements, demonstrates several gaps in Australia’s anti-corruption and 
integrity system with regard to federal parliamentarians. These include: a clear standard as 
to what conduct satisfies ‘misconduct’ or ‘corruption’; strong enforcement powers enabling 
the compulsion of documents; consequences for breaching standards; and the absence of 
an effective mechanism for addressing conduct once the member in question has left 
Parliament. Additionally, as this report was only revealed via a Freedom of Information 
request, transparency surrounding investigations is lacking. A requirement to make findings 
public, or to hold public hearings, would increase the likelihood of meaningful accountability.   
 
Changes to the existing regime have been implemented, but they appear unlikely to be 
particularly effective. In February 2017, in the wake of another parliamentary entitlements 
                                                          
27 Peter Slipper was a notable exception; though the case was dismissed on appeal: Slipper v Turner [2015] 
ACTSC 27 (26 February 2015). 
28 Australian National Audit Office, Parliamentarians’ Entitlements 1999-2000 (Audit Report No 5, 7 August 
2001) 17 [15]; Australian National Audit Office, Administration of Parliamentarians’ Entitlements by the 
Department of Finance and Deregulation (2009); Commonwealth of Australia, Committee for Review of 
Parliamentary Entitlements, An Independent Parliamentary Entitlements System: Review (February 2016) 1-2 
[5]-[6]. 
29 Latika Bourke, ‘Bronwyn Bishop cut short participation in expenses review after repaying more than $6700, 
report reveals’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 30 March 2017 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-news/bronwyn-bishop-cut-short-cooperation-with-expenses-review-after-repaying-more-than-
6700-report-reveals-20170329-gv9g8r.html.  
30 Department of Finance Report, Travel and Related Entitlements of the Hon Bronwyn Bishop: 1 July 2005-30 
July 2015 (August 2016) 6 [1.11]. 
 
 
controversy that culminated in Health Minister Sussan Ley’s resignation, the Commonwealth 
Parliament established an Independent Parliamentary Expenses Authority (IPEA),31 based 
on the model used by the United Kingdom. Its functions include administering and 
overseeing the work expenses of parliamentarians and ministers.  
 
Persons are required to give the Authority information or documents relevant to its reporting 
and auditing functions, which includes material relating to work and travel expenses.32 A 
criminal penalty may be levied for contravening this requirement. However, such a penalty 
can be excused if it ‘might incriminate the person or expose the person to a penalty’.33 
Consequently, the IPEA is not able to impose sanctions for failing to comply with an order to 
provide documents. The IPEA therefore has weaker powers than many civil regulators 
whose statutory regimes do not allow people to refuse on the basis of a privilege against self-
incrimination.  
 
Further, in the case of a breach of expenses, it is not clear what avenues the IPEA could 
pursue other than recovery of payments. This contrasts to the situation in the UK where the 
Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) operates within a stronger integrity 
regime. Members of Parliament entitlement claims are published online every two-months, 
and are searchable via an interactive map.34 A statutory compliance officer has the authority 
to review IPSA’s decisions about claims, and publishes all investigations into allegations of 
misuse of entitlements online.35 In addition to recovering overpayments to parliamentarians, 
the compliance officer has the authority to impose penalties on Members ‘for failing to 
comply with a request for information or a repayment direction’.36 A Member of Parliament 
who knowingly makes a false or misleading claim is liable for 12 months imprisonment.37  
 
Despite the introduction of the IPEA, Australia’s anti-corruption and integrity system still lacks 
an effective mechanism for holding federal politicians accountable at the same standards as 
other members of the public. Certainly, the IPEA could be reformed in line with the powers of 
the UK IPSA, which operates under an enhanced transparency regime, and with 
considerable powers of enforcement and sanction. However, a better approach would be the 
                                                          
31 Independent Parliamentary Expenses Authority Act 2017 (Cth). 
32 Independent Parliamentary Expenses Authority Act 2017 (Cth) s 53 
33 Independent Parliamentary Expenses Authority Act 2017 (Cth) s 55. 
34 Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, ‘MP Costs: Interactive Map’ http://www.theipsa.org.uk/mp-
costs/interactive-map/.  
35 Compliance Officer for Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, ‘Completed Reviews’, 
http://www.parliamentarycompliance.org.uk/transparency/Pages/completed-reviews.aspx.  
36 Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, IPSA’s First Parliament 2010-2015: Regulation, Support, 
and Remuneration (May 2016) 17 [60]. 
37 Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 (c 13) s 10. 
 
 
introduction of a national integrity commission with authority over federal parliamentarians. 
As we note in the final section, a single body can develop investigatory and policy expertise, 
as well as provide leadership and confidence within the community that corruption is being 
dealt with. As a prominent, one-stop-shop, it would also encourage greater reporting of 
allegations, reducing corruption throughout the federal government.   
 
Effect of gaps in Australia’s anti-corruption system   
Surveys indicate that the share of Australians who trust in government has fallen. For 
instance, the global 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer found that Australians’ trust in 
government fell by 8 points between 2016 and 2017.38 Likewise, empirical work by the 
University of Canberra’s Institute for Governance and Public Analysis and the Museum of 
Australian Democracy released in 2016 has found that trust in government and politicians is 
now at the lowest levels in over two decades, indicating that ‘only 42 per cent of Australians 
are happy with the way democracy works in the country’.39 Sarah Cameron and Ian 
McAllister’s long-running Trends in Australian Political Opinion reveals a similar result. 
Cameron and McAllister found that since 2007, trust in government has fallen 17 points, and 
the percentage of people satisfied with democracy has dropped 26 points.40 These results 
are also reflected in Scanlon Foundation surveys, which, since 2010, ‘have registered 
continuing low level of trust in the federal parliament’.41 While declining trust in government is 
a global phenomenon and a result of multiple causes, Australia’s inadequate anti-corruption 
and integrity system is fuelling concerns. Recurring parliamentary expenses scandals trigger 
‘a public loss of faith in [Parliament] and its members’,42 ‘destroying public confidence in the 
integrity of Parliament’43 and have a ‘corrosive effect’ on democracy.44  
 
Trust in government is integral for good governance and social cohesion. A 2013 OECD 
Report highlighted trust in government as a determinant of effective functioning of 
democracy: 
 
                                                          
38 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer, ‘Global Results: ‘Trust in Government Further Evaporates’ 13 
http://www.edelman.com/global-results/.  
39 University of Canberra, ‘Trust, An Absent Commodity in this Election: UC-IGPA’, 24 June 2016 
http://www.governanceinstitute.edu.au/news-and-media/news/104/trust-an-absent-commodity-in-this-election-
uc-igpa.  
40 Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, Trends in Australian Political Opinion: Results from the Australian 
Election Study 1987-2016 (ANU Press, 2016) 74-75. 
41 Andrew Markus, Mapping Social Cohesion: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys 2016 (Scanlon Foundation, 
2016) 3.  
42 ‘Pollies Caught Out by Public Expectations’, The Australian (Sydney), 26 May 2012, 15 cited in Blackham 
and Williams, above n 19, 131.  
43 Phillip Hudson, ‘High Time for an Umpire in Parliament’, Herald-Sun (Melbourne), 25 May 2012, 39. 
44 Amanda Lohrey, ‘Comment: Australian Democracy and the Right to Party’, The Monthly (July 2012  
 
 
Trust in government has been identified as one of the most important 
foundations upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems 
are built. Trust is essential for social cohesion and well-being as it affects 
governments’ ability to govern and enables them to act without having to 
resort to coercion. Consequently, it is an efficient means of lowering 
transaction costs in any social, economic and political relationship.45  
 
It is critical that Australia arrest the decline in faith in our democratic institutions. Revamping 
our under-inclusive and unwieldy anti-corruption and integrity system is a central element of 
this strategy.  
 
How can this be fixed?  
Australia’s national corruption framework is under-inclusive and unwieldy. Our article has 
identified two major problems with the existing multi-agency approach: the multiplicity of 
agencies responsible for investigating allegations of corrupt conduct make it difficult for 
individuals to know to which body they should address their allegations, and the absence of 
an effective mechanism to hold federal parliamentarians to account detracts from Australia’s 
commitment to good governance.  
 
A national whole-of-government anti-corruption body, able to apply a uniform standard of 
corrupt conduct across all parts of government, offers the best hope for rectifying these 
problems. Such a body will operate as a ‘one-stop-shop’, providing a clear path for persons 
with information about alleged corrupt conduct to report; coordinate prevention, risk 
assessment and monitoring activities; and eliminate gaps in the existing regime. As the 2016 
Interim Report of the Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity 
Commission noted, a national whole-of-government anti-corruption body has broad potential 
benefits: 
 
While the most prominent function of a NAC [National Anti-Corruption 
Commission] is the discovery and investigation of corruption, a NAC may also 
improve policy co-ordination, provide leadership and education services, 
reduce potential jurisdictional gaps, increase administrative efficiency, send an 
unambiguous signal that the issue of corruption is being taken seriously, and 
                                                          
45 OECD, Government at a Glance 2013 (2013) 21 (emphasis in original). 
 
 
provide confidence to the public that corruption is minimised at the highest 
level of government.46 
 
As with state-based whole-of-government anti-corruption bodies,47 the national body should 
also be tasked with an educative function. As the 2016 Interim Report identified, ‘[p]roviding 
education services surrounding corruption can increase the resilience of organisations and 
individuals to corruption, and clarify expectations around what does and does not constitute 
corrupt behaviours.48  
 
Critics of a national integrity commission argue that its functions would overlap with other 
institutions already operating as part of the multi-agency approach. This is concerning 
because, as the Institute of Public Affairs has suggested, anti-corruption agencies can erode 
individual legal protections.49 Conversely, a single integrity body could be subject to 
budgetary pressures, shielding government in the face of allegations of corruption. These are 
both real concerns, but they can be managed. If properly designed and resourced, a national 
integrity commission would not weaken the rule of law or inappropriately shield government 
from accountability.  
 
The case for whole-of-government anti-corruption bodies has proved overwhelming in the 
states. They are now in place in every state jurisdiction, and evidence suggests that they 
have been successful in revealing serious corruption.50 It is beyond time that a similar body is 
established at the federal level in Australia.51 At a time where trust in government and 
democratic institutions is falling precipitously, a national whole-of-government anti-corruption 
and integrity body, is sorely needed.  
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Interim Report (2016) 27 [3.71]. 
47 See, eg, Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) s 13(1)(h). 
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Law. This article is based upon a submission the authors made to the Senate Select 
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